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·In the Supreme Court 
·of the State of Utah 
ELLEN SMITH MOODY and CHARLES 
MOODY, her husband, 
Appellants and Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JUANITA C. SMITH, individually, and 
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian of the 
Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor, 
JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHEL 
SMITH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and 
RICHARD ROE, and all persons un-
known claiming any right, title, estate 
or interest in and to the real property 
subject of this action, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
Case No. 
2100 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants' brief fairly states the nature of the case as 
well as the facts as far as it goes. Appellants' and Respondents' 
predecessor, David G. Smith, executed and entered into a lease 
agreement December 1, 1950, containing the following pro-
vtston: 
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c (There is attached to this lease a Contract of Sale 
· between the above parties II:J.arked Exhibit ttl"-, ·which 
Contract of Sale by this reference is herein incorporated 
and by these presents made a part hereof. It is mutually 
agreed between the lessors and the lessee that in con-
sideration of the foregoing covenants and agreements 
of the parties, the lessee shall have, and he is hereby 
granted, an option to purchase the foregoing interest 
of the lessors in and to tbe above-described lands, rights, 
p~rmits and pri~ile ges at a price and on the terms pro-
vtded on the satd Contract of Sale at any time during 
the term of the foregoing lease.-'' (R. 23, 24). (Em-
phasis added.) 
The lease also contains the following provision: 
ttThis lease shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the heirs, successors and assigns of the re-
spective parties." (R. 24.) 
The term of this lease ran for a period of five years from 
the first day of January, 1951, to the 31st day of December, 
195 5 (R. 23). The facts undisputed by the evidence and plead-
ings show that David G. Smith, the respondent's deceased 
husband, in his lifetime was in the process of acquiring the 
sheep ranch of his father. Following the elder Mr. Smith's 
death in 1925, his wife disposed of her dower interest in the 
property by inter vivos transactions, and each of the five chil-
dren, namely: David Smith, Rachael Jensen, Joseph Smith, 
Josephine Voda and Ellen Moody, acquired an undivided one-
fifth interest therein (R. 5, 6). Thereafter, and prior to 1950, 
Joseph Smith deeded his one-fifth interest to David Smith on 
an exchange of property. The other sisters, Josephine, Rachael 
and Ellen Moody (appellant). each sold their interest for the 
san1e purchase price, $19,233 . .32. Josephine Voda's interest 
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\vas an outright purchase, while Rachael and Ellen Moody's 
interests were by lease and option to buy. Josephine and 
Rachael have recognized the right of the respondent to pur-
chase their interests and disclaimed any interest in this law-
suit (R. 41, 43). The only issue is \vhether or not Ellen Moody 
and her husband are bound by the terms of the lease and the 
option. Each of the family was treated equally and fairly by 
David in acquiring the whole interest and for the same pur-
chase price per sister and brother, namely: $19,233.32. 
David Smith thereafter went into possession of the ranch 
property pursuant to the terms of the lease on January 1, 
1951, (R. 215) for a term of five years ending December 31, 
1955, and during that tenn, he and his wife paid in excess of 
$10,000.00 in real property taxes (R. 217) as provided by the 
lease, as well as all the fees, levies and other assessments 
that came due upon the land and the interest in grazing rights. 
David G. Smith died in November of 1953 (R. 215), and 
thereafter, his wife, Juanita C. Smith, on behalf of herself 
and her minor child, Dennis C. Smith, exercised and executed 
the option provided by the lease on October 11, 19 55, tendering 
to the appellants the sum of $2,233.40, and likewise, tendered 
the annual payments thereafter required by the option purchase 
agreements, all of which were rejected and refused by the 
appellants (R. 201, 202, 203, 204). 
If ever a transaction was conspicuously clear and plain, 
this is. The appellants executed a lease agreement with an 
option attached in which no essential term was omitted; David 
Smith agreed to lease for a term of five years. The annual 
rental for the five year term of $604.38 payable November 
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1st and June 15th of each year during the term of the lease. 
Smith paid this rental. He also paid all taxes, fees, levies and 
assessments. The lease was made binding upon the heirs, 
successors and assigns of both parties. Smith was granted the 
option to buy the lessors' (appellants') interest in the lands} 
rights, per1nits and privileges at the price and on the terms 
provided in the proposed contract at any time during the term 
of the lease. The property was fully described as to metes and 
bounds (R. 31, 32, 33, 34). After the trial court heard the 
evidence and ruled in favor of the respondent on her Counter-
claim and against the appellants on their Petition for Partition 
(R. 83, 84), the respondent tendered, in open court, to the 
appellants the sum of $18,306.88 (R. 104), which was the 
total amount then due appellants for their interest in the 
aforesaid property, less the attorneys' fees awarded by the 
court, court costs awarded respondent, certain tax payment 
credits to which appellants were entitled, less appellants' 
share of bringing the abstract up to date, being a total net 
amount due of $18,306.88 (R. 110). This tender likewise was 
refused and rejected by the appellants (R. 265, 266). 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING AND FIND-
ING 'fHAT' APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT HAD EX-
FCU11ED AN OPTION ATTACHED TO THE LEASE. 
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A. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR. IN FINDING AND 
HOLDING THAT THE OPTION WAS ENFORCEABLE 
AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED. 
B. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING 
THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH 
MOODY AND CHARLES MOODY, TOGETHER WITH 
EXHIBITS nA" ((B" "C" ((D" "E" nF" AND "G" 
' ' ' ' ' ' . 
C. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING AND EN-
TERING FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
9, 11 AND 12, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1, 
2 AND 3. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN I-IOLDING AND FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT HAD EX-
ECUTED AN OPTION ATTACHED TO THE LEASE. 
Appellants' first point is totally untenable for the reason 
that appellants admit in paragraph 1 of their Reply to re-
spondent's Counterclaim: 
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((That on or about December 1, 1950, she did enter 
into a lease agreement with David G. Smith." (R. 39). 
Appellants' argument in support of Point I is stated as follows: 
·'This action centers around the question of whether 
or not the document marked Exhibit '1' is a binding 
option requiring Ellen Smith Moody to convey her 
one-fifth ( 1-5) interest in the ranch to the Respondents 
according to the terms of said Exhibit. * * * Appellants 
contending that said document was nothing more than 
a lease. * * * " 
This argument departs entirely from the point which it is 
supposed to prove. The point appellants attempt to make 
is that no option with the contract to purchase had ever been 
executed. Then the argument supporting Point I ends with 
this statement: 
· · * * * This general proposition is discussed under 
the following points:" 
Thereafter, follow appellants' Points A, B and C. 
It will be noted that the foregoing bears no relation to 
Point I or the arguments made in support thereof. Appellants 
impliedly admit that an option was entered into, but assert 
that it is impossible of performance and am~iguous, and 
therefore. unenforceable. 
Before proceeding to an examination of the foregoing 
point, respondent calls attention to paragraph 2 of her Counter-
claim (R. 21) \vherein it is alleged that respondent exercised 
said option by tendering the amount to be paid as specified in 
the option agreement, which tender was rejected and the 
agreen1ent dishonored. On October 11, 1955, the respondent 
n1ade her check payable in the amount of $2,233.-10. by \vhich 
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she sought to exercise the option (R~ 204). On the following 
year, October 29, 1956, respondent made payable and mailed 
to appellants another check in the amount.of $2,568.88, which 
was the first annual payn1ent required by the agreement. This 
too v1as rejected (R. 204). Appellants, in replying to respond-
ent's allegation, admitted that respondent did tender to the 
plaintiff a sum of money and that appellants did refuse to 
accept said sum of money. 
Returning to Point A, appellants argue that the alleged 
contract is impossible of performance because: ( 1) the con-
tract bears date a year prior to the execution date of the lease; 
( 2) the date of possession in paragraph 2 of the contract is 
stated as being January 1, 1950; ( 3) the dates for paying 
the purchase price are fixed as November 1, 1951, and No-
vember 1 each year thereafter; ( 4) delivery of an abstract 
is set for July 1, 1951, and certification thereof is June 1, 195 5; 
( 5) delivery of various documents is set for February 15, 1951; 
( 6) payment of all taxes after January 1, 1950; ( 7) the date 
of acknowledgment of the contract is, ((the ____ day of November, 
1950." 
As to Nos. 4 (delivery of the abstract) and 6 (payment 
of taxes), there is no problem because the abstract has been 
brought up to date, certified, paid for, and necessary credits 
given, and is now in the possession of the respondents, and 
she is satisfied therewith. All taxes have been paid and credit 
given (R. 106). As to No. 7, this date is wholly imtnaterial 
because the contract .was n~ver signed. It was n1erely tnad~ a 
part of the lease agreement by reference ancl is totally inte-
grated into the lease agreement and the option. The contract 
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~ould not be . signed as .long as it remained executory. The 
option provision of the lease upon exercise thereof·_ by.' re~ 
spondent would simply ripen into an executed purchase con~ 
tract at any time during the .five year term of the lease, if so 
exercised before December 31, 1955. When, on October 11, 
1955, respondent exercised the option, then only did it become 
an executed option, and none of its terms could have been 
performed before that time and did not have to be pe1'formed 
before that time. Murfee v. Porter, (Cal.), 214 P.2d 543. 
None of the dates and confusion suggested by appellants 
are in any sense ambiguous and impossible. They are merely 
repugnant to the time of performance fixed in the lease, and 
\Ve cannot agree with appellants that performance was predi-
cated upon these dates. Their argument may be ignored since 
these dates cannot be reconciled with the terms of the option 
given to respondent in clear and unambiguous language. 
There is a well established rule which disposes of such 
a so·called problem as raised by the appellants: 
"It has been laid down as elementary law that if two 
clauses of an agreement are so totally repugnant to 
each other that they cannot stand together, the first 
shall be received and the last rejected, especially \vhen 
the latter is inconsistent \vith the general purpose of 
the instrument and would nullify it." 12 Am. Jur. 778, 
779, Sec. 43; citing numerous cases in support of this 
doctrine. 
Throughout the trial and in appellants' brief, they assert 
the non Jequitor that it was the burden of the respondent to 
show ·by parole and extrinsic evidence (R. 227) that re-
spondent had an enforceable agreement. This argument n1ust 
10 
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fail for there is no ambiguity --between -the· integrated contract 
and option here under: consideration. ·what we· have here are 
two sets ·of phrases; expressed and clea~~ unambiguous terms 
which cannot be reconciled. The first set contained a signed 
and acknowledged lease, and we quote again in full: 
((It is mutually agreed between the lessors and the 
lessee that in consideration of the foregoing. covenants 
and agreements of the parties, the lessee shall have, 
and he is hereby granted, an option to purchase the 
foregoing interest of the lessors in and to the above-
described lands, rights, permits and privileges at a 
price and on the terms provided in the said contract 
of sale at any time during the term of the foregoing 
lease." 
By the very term of this option, respondent would not be 
entitled to a contract of sale of this property until he had exer-
cised the option which was to remain open for five years, and 
there is no evidence or pretense that respondent exercised his 
option on the very day that the lease was signed by the parties. 
So, the dates in Exhibit eel" are meaningless. However, it 
was necessary to state the price to be paid for the property 
under option, $19,233.32, the terms under which it might be 
paid, namely: $1,888.88 per year, or more at buyer's option 
(R. 27), the de~cription of the property sold, and other matters 
which the parties deem necessary to consummate the deal. 
All of these matters are fully set forth in Exhibit (( 1 ". There 
is nothing ambiguous about the dates set forth in Exhibit 
H 1 ",_ but t~ey are repugnant to th_e_ date~ Sf:t ou~ in th~ lease 
and option and when rejected, as they m2:y .be,. the contract 
becomes whole and meaningful. 
11 
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c (When a. particular word,· or words, or the. contract 
. as a ~hole,. is susceptible to ~o meanings, one of v1,hich 
will uphold the contract and render , i~ valid an~ ~n­
forceable, and the other of which will destroy it· arid 
render it invalid or ineffective, the former will be 
adopted so as to uphold the contract, the parties having 
presumed to having intended to make a binding con-
tract." 17 C.J.S. 735, 736, Sec. 318. 
This is especially true v1hen the contract is attacked by 
one \Vho has been benefited thereby as have the appellants as 
landlords for more than five years. 
Cases are cited from nearly every jurisdiction upholding 
this doctrine, including this Court: 
((A construction giving instruments legal effect to 
accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can 
reasonably be done and between two possible con-
structions, that will be adopted which establishes a valid 
contract." Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retit'ement 
Board, (Utah), 142 P.2d 657. 
In Vance v. Arnold, (Utah) 201 P.2d 475, at page 479, this 
court holds: 
c CW e conceive it our duty in interpreting the plans, 
specifications and provisions which forn1 part of this 
contract, to reconcile the provisions, if reasonably pos-
sible, so as to give effect to all and to construe the 
con1plete contract to carry out its dominant purpose. 
If t\VO interpretations are possible, one of \vhich would 
lead to confusion, uncertainty or elimination of one 
of the essential parts of the contract, and one ·which 
\\'Ould harmonize all provisions of the ·rights, and 
rnake the contract complete. fair and usual, the latter 
interpretation should be preferred." 
12 
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. And, to the same effect, see Hardinge v. Eimco, (Utah) 
266 P.2d 494; Morgan v. Fit'estone Tit'e, (Ida.) 201 P.2d 976; 
Basler v. Warren, (C.C.A. TO), 159 F.2d 41. 
Respondent submits that taking the words of this lease 
and option in their ordinary and usual meaning, no substantive 
clause must be allowed to perish by a strained construction, 
and wherever possible, it is the duty of the court to prevent 
the contract from perishing, or construing it so as its pro-
visions are entirely neutralized. 
Both of the parties entered into this lease and option 
agreement with established and definite meaning, and both 
parties were reasonably intelligent people acquainted with all 
the operative usage of the terms ((lease and option," and must 
have meant what they intended to mean in drafting these 
instruments. In the absence of allegations of fraud or mis-
representation, the appellants cannot now argue that they 
are not bound by this fully integrated agreement. 
Should any question arise as to the sufficiency of the 
consideration, Tilton v. Sterling (Utah), 77 Pac. 758, holds: 
"The lease is the sufficient consideration to support 
the option and lessor cannot withdraw it before the 
time given to except it has expired." 
In face of all this, the appellants now attempt to renege 
and dishonor this agreement by asserting that prior parole 
dealings should alter or vary the terms of the contract. The 
hl\v is· against them. 
See La1'son v. Smith (Iowa), 156 N.W. 813, holding: 
13 
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'(Lessor may not show by parole evidence that there 
'vas· no consideration for an option to purchase which 
is in the written lease where no mistake or. fraud is 
pleaded." 
See Hunter v. Farrell (~LB.), 42 N.B. 323, holding: 
((Lessor may not show by parole evidence that an 
option to purchase in the lease was simply an agreement 
to give' the lessee a preference if the lessor decided to 
sell at the figure named.'' 
See Smith v. Caldwell (Ark.), 95 S.W. 467, holding: 
CCA written contract for the rental or land with option 
to purchase may not be shown by oral testimony to 
have been intended to be a contract for sale." 
And, Thomas v. Johnson (Ark.), 95 S.W. 468, to the same 
effect; Barnhard v. Stern (Wis.), 196 N.W. 245; Bishop v. 
Milton (Ark.), 152 S.W. 2d 299, holding: 
c (Parole evidence not admissible to show the parties 
intended to make a different contract where the tenant 
was given an option to purchase." 
It follows, we believe, that appellants should be required 
to specifically perform the contract, less the land withdrawn 
through the prior transactions with the Moons in 1951 (R. 83), 
which the trial court quite properly excepted, and which is 
excepted from the deeds tendered to appellants for their 
execution. 
Appellants cite Bu1't t'. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 
Pac. 234, for a different purpose. That case recognizes all the 
tenns of a contract as \vritten must be given full force and 
effect when: 
14 
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. nin construing a contract, the words and .expressions 
used by . the parties must be given full force and effect 
unless to do so would lead to an ·absurdity, or is con-
trary to the manifest purpose or intention of the 
parties." (p. 236). 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWERS TO 
APPELLANTS' POINTS B AND C 
It has already been shown that the lease and option was 
executed on December 1, 1950, and the Contract of Sale was 
integrated within the lease and option as a part of it for the 
purposes mentioned. It is obvious that testimony proffered by 
Joseph Smith, Ellen Smith Moody or Charles Moody, her 
husband, could have had no purpose whatever except to attempt 
to vary the terms of a plain, clear, unambiguous written con-
tract by parole. We believe it elementary that such testimony 
n1ay not be received, and therefore believe that it is unnecessary 
to further burden this Court with answering citations on the 
Utah Dead Man's Statute. We do observe, however, that when 
Ellen Smith Moody was called by the respondent as a witness, 
the area of her testimony had to do entirely wit~ the question 
of whether or not respondent had properly paid all taxes due 
under the lease. It clearly appears from the transcript on the 
trial that through appellants' own actions, tax notices for some 
of this property were never delivered to Juanita C. Smith, 
and therefore not paid by her. Appellants attempted to pay 
these taxes themselves and use such payment as an excuse for 
rejecting the lease. The tr~nscript shows clearly that had Ellen 
Smith Moody not: attempted to circumvent these notices,. the 
respondent would have paid them in due course (R. 218, 
15 
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219, 220, 22l). The Court has allowed respondent to tender 
back to Mrs. Moody approximately $450.00 which represented 
the amount of taxes paid by the appellants that should have 
been directed to the respondent. The only purpose in offering 
Mrs. Moody's testimony was to clear up the question of the 
payment of these taxes, facts that arose after, not before, the 
death of her brother, David. 
It may be noted that all of the objections raised to the 
offered testimony and exhibits, of which appellants now com-
plain, were based not only upon the Dead Man's Statute, but 
also upon the general objection that such testimony and exhibits 
could not vary the terms of the lease and option, and that 
such testimony and exhibits violated the parole evidence rule. 
We believe these objections were properly sustained. 
The lower court's Findings and Conclusions were proper, 
and there was no error committed in such Findings and Con-
clusions. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants should be required to specifically perform their 
contract. They should be ordered to accept the $18,306.88 
heretofore tendered by the respondent, and should be ordered 
to execute, sign and deliver to the respondent the deeds pre-
pared for their signature filed in this record. Respondent was 
granted $1,000.00 attorneys' fee as provided for in said lease, 
and herein urges that additional litigation caused by this appeal 
justifies this Court in a\varding her an additional reasonable 
attorneys' fee. Respondent contends that the trial court's 
16 
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1dgment should be affirmed in order that this case should 
lOt lead to the kind of absurdity desired by appellants. 
March 10, 1958. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DRAPER, SANDACK & DRAPER 
By D. M. Draper and 
A. W. Sandack 
Attorneys for Respondents 
405 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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RECEIVED----------:----------:----copies of the within Brief of 
Respondent~; this lOth day of March, 1958. 
- .·- . .... ~·- - .. 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
Attorneys for Appellanis 
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